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When Conditions Go Bad: An Examination of the 
Problems Inherent in the Conditional Use Permitting 
System 
The purpose of a Conditional Use Permit is to allow proper 
integration of uses into the community which may only be suitable 
in specific locations and may have potentially detrimental 
characteristics if not properly designed, located, and conditioned.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a piece of property in Salt Lake City, Utah.2 This 
property is located within a Neighborhood Commercial zone. This 
zone “is intended to provide for small scale, low intensity 
commercial uses that can be located within and serve residential 
neighborhoods.”3 Within this zone, there are numerous permitted 
uses such as bed and breakfasts, medical clinics, daycare centers, 
museums, offices, urban farms, and recycling collection stations.4 
Seeing a business opportunity in the community, the property owner 
decides to open a gas station. However, this is not a permitted use in 
this zone; it is a conditional use. 
The Salt Lake City Code defines a conditional use as “a land use 
which, because of its unique characteristics or potential impact on 
the municipality, surrounding neighbors or adjacent land uses, may 
not be compatible or may be compatible only if certain conditions 
are required that mitigate or eliminate the negative impacts.”5 
Deciding to move forward with building a gas station, the property 
owner applies for a conditional use permit. Under Utah law, a 
conditional use application “shall be approved if reasonable 
conditions” are applied to the property that “mitigate the reasonably 
 
 1. PROVO, UTAH, CODE § 14.02.040 (2014) available at 
http://www.codepublishing.com/ut/provo/html/Provo14/Provo140200.html#14.02.040. 
 2. The author uses Salt Lake City merely as an example because he is familiar with the 
zoning laws in Salt Lake City. 
 3. Salt Lake City Zoning Districts, MAPS.SLCGOV, http://maps.slcgov.com/mws/zon
ing.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 4. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.33 (2014), available at http://www.sterling
codifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=672 [hereinafter SLC CODE]. 
 5. Id. at 21A.54.010(A). 
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anticipated detrimental effects” of the conditional use.6 Unsure what 
it means to impose a “reasonable condition,” the property owner 
consults the Salt Lake City Code for guidance and finds the 
following: 
C. Conditions Imposed: The planning commission, or in the case 
of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or the 
director’s designee, may impose on a conditional use any 
conditions necessary to address the foregoing factors which may 
include, but are not limited to: 
1. Conditions on the scope of the use; its character, location, 
hours and methods of operation, architecture, signage, 
construction, landscaping, access, loading and parking, sanitation, 
drainage and utilities, fencing and screening, and setbacks; and 
2. Conditions needed to mitigate any natural hazards; assure 
public safety; address environmental impacts; and mitigate dust, 
fumes, smoke, odor, noise, vibrations; chemicals, toxins, 
pathogens, gases, heat, light, and radiation.7 
Under the Salt Lake City Code, the planning commission can 
impose conditions on the conditional use permit covering almost any 
aspect related to the property or its use. Additionally, there are no 
real limits to the conditions that can be imposed. The planning 
commission has extremely broad authority to impose conditions, and 
this broad authority can, and in some cases does, lead to violations of 
property owners’ rights. Based on these conditions, the property 
owner in this hypothetical has little idea what might be asked of her 
if she is granted her permit. Vague standards, like this one, are only 
one of the myriad problems inherent in conditional use permits. 
While conditional use permits provide an important tool to land 
use boards, they also create a host of problems. These permits are 
intended to provide flexibility to cities and give them a means to 
control growth and mitigate negative externalities. However, that 
same flexibility gives rise to great uncertainty, which can lead to a host 
of legal issues, not the least of which is violation of constitutional 
rights. The interplay between these conflicting forces, flexibility and 
certainty, is at the heart of the conditional permitting scheme. 
Flexibility is desired, but at the same time shunned. 
 
 6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-507(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 7. SLC CODE § 21A.54.080(C). 
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This Comment will examine the interplay between flexibility and 
certainty and will look at how conditional use permits can, and often 
do, lead to violations of landowners’ rights. Part I of this Comment 
will begin by providing an overview of conditional use permits by 
explaining the purpose, features, and function of a conditional use 
permit. Then Part II will examine some of the common problems 
faced by property owners seeking conditional use permits. These 
problems include unconstitutional vagueness, violations of the 
nondelegation doctrine, unconstitutional exactions, violations of 
vested rights and nonconforming use statutes, and various other 
constitutional problems. Part III concludes. 
I. WHAT IS A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT? 
Before we can delve into the myriad of problems inherent in the 
operation of conditional use permits, we must first understand what 
they are and how they function. This Part will provide a brief 
overview of the conditional use permitting scheme by explaining 
what a conditional use permit is, why political subdivisions use 
conditional permits, how a conditional use permit ordinance works, 
and what is meant by attaching “reasonable conditions” to a 
conditional use permit. 
A. What Is a Conditional Use Permit and How Does It Differ from 
Other Land Use Planning Devices? 
Within a land use zone there are typically permitted uses, 
conditional uses, and uses that are not allowed.8 Conditional uses 
fulfill an important role in land use planning. These uses (sometimes 
termed “special uses”) are intended to provide flexibility to 
municipalities and prevent the negative externalities of those uses.9 
Without conditional uses, a use that may be beneficial to the 
character and nature of a zone, but that also produces negative 
externalities, would either be allowed without restrictions or not 
allowed under any circumstances. This all-or-nothing approach can 
cripple a planning commission’s ability to provide necessary services 
 
 8. See SLC CODE at § 21A.33, for a sample land use table illustrating what uses are 
permitted, conditional, or not allowed within the commercial zones of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 9. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Attack on Validity of Zoning Statute, Ordinance, or 
Regulation on Ground of Improper Delegation of Authority to Board or Officer, 58 A.L.R.2d 
1083 (1958). 
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within a particular zone if those services may also impose some 
negative externalities on that zone. A conditional use permit allows 
that city to provide the necessary property uses and control the 
negative impact of that use. 
Take a typical residential zone in Portland, Oregon, as an 
example of the importance of conditional uses. Within a residential 
zone, we would expect to find primarily single-family dwellings. 
Therefore, it would come as no surprise to find “household living” is 
a permitted use within this zone.10 Furthermore, within this zone 
you would not expect to find railroad yards, waste disposal facilities, 
or manufacturing plants. Unsurprisingly, such uses are not permitted 
in residential zones in Portland.11 However, the people living in a 
residential zone desire more than just housing within their zone. The 
people living there will need schools for their children to attend and 
hospitals for when accidents occur, as well as churches, parks, and 
other community facilities. These are all examples of conditional uses 
within Portland residential zones.12 While these uses are needed 
within that zone, they are not similar in nature to a house. They 
create noise and light pollution, increase traffic, and may lead to 
safety concerns within a residential zone. Thus, allowing them as 
conditional uses allows the planning authority to provide necessary 
services, while at the same time ameliorating the negative 
consequences of these uses. The planning authority can ameliorate 
these negative externalities by imposing conditions aimed at limiting 
these negative effects. 
Portland’s zoning ordinance explains why conditional uses are 
necessary. Portland’s ordinance states: 
Certain uses are conditional uses instead of being allowed 
outright, although they may have beneficial effects and serve 
important public interests. They are subject to the conditional use 
regulations because they may, but do not necessarily, have 
significant adverse effects on the environment, overburden public 
services, change the desired character of an area, or create major 
nuisances. A review of these uses is necessary due to the potential 
individual or cumulative impacts they may have on the 
surrounding area or neighborhood. The conditional use review 
 
 10. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 33.110.120 tbl.110-1 (2014), available at 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/53295. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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provides an opportunity to allow the use when there are minimal 
impacts, to allow the use but impose mitigation measures to 
address identified concerns, or to deny the use if the concerns 
cannot be resolved.13 
Thus, when used properly, conditional use permits provide a 
great benefit to a community. They allow a community to provide 
uses that “serve important public interests,” while giving the 
community the power to reduce the negative effects of that use.14 
Despite the positive benefits from adopting conditional uses 
within a zoning ordinance, there is often much confusion about how 
the permits operate. On the surface, conditional use permits seem 
the same as other zoning devices, such as variances and special 
exemptions. However, conditional use permits both function and 
operate differently. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court was tasked with 
enumerating the differences between conditional use permits and 
other means of providing flexibility within a zoning plan.15 In Burns 
Holdings, LLC v. Teton County, Burns Holding, LLC sought to 
build a concrete batch plant near the city of Driggs, Idaho.16 The 
Driggs zoning ordinance stated “‘[a]ny building or structure or 
portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet 
in height unless approved by conditional use permit.’”17 Relying on 
this language, Burns filed an application for a conditional use permit 
to erect a structure seventy-five feet high.18 The city planning and 
zoning department approved Burns’ application.19 The application 
then was sent to the county for approval.20 The county, however, 
was confused.21 It did not know what decision it was supposed to 
make.22 Additionally, the county was unsure “whether the matter 
being considered was an appeal from the decision of the city 
 
 13. Id. at § 33.815.010, available at http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/
53475. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 272 P.3d 412, 413 
(Idaho 2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 414 (quoting DRIGGS, IDAHO, CODE & ORDINANCES ch. 2, § 13(c)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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planning and zoning department or a decision for the county to 
make.”23 Furthermore, the county did not know whether Burns’ 
application was for a variance or a conditional use permit, even 
though Burns filed an application for a conditional use permit.24 
After much debate, and not really resolving any of its uncertainties, 
the county denied Burns’ application for a conditional use permit.25 
Eventually, the matter found its way before the Idaho Supreme 
Court, which affirmed the denial of the conditional use permit and, 
more importantly, clarified the difference between a variance and a 
conditional use permit.26 Justice Eismann, writing for the court, 
explained “[a] variance is a means of obtaining a waiver of certain 
requirements of a zoning ordinance,” such as bulk, height, and 
placement requirements.27 Additionally, “[a] variance can only be 
granted ‘upon a showing of undue hardship because of 
characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict with 
the public interest.’”28 A conditional use permit, on the other hand, 
relates to the proposed use of property.29 Such a permit may be 
granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the 
terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions pursuant to the 
ordinance, and not in conflict with the zoning plan.30 
The court continued, stating that a conditional use permit 
requires the zoning authority “to require specified types of 
conditions . . . to mitigate the adverse effects that the development 
and/or operation of the proposed use may have upon other 
properties or upon the ability of the political subdivisions to provide 
[necessary] services . . . .”31 What is more, the Idaho Code provides a 
non-exhaustive list of the types of conditions that can be attached to 
a conditional use permit.32 Some of the conditions that may be 
attached include (1) minimizing adverse impacts on other properties; 
(2) assuring the property is properly maintained; (3) requiring on- or 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 416. 
 27. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 28. Id. (citation omitted). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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off-site public facilities; and (4) “[r]equiring mitigation of effects of 
the proposed development upon” schools and other services 
delivered by a political subdivision.33 
In addition to differences in the purposes of a variance and a 
conditional use permit, “[t]he nature of the hearing for the issuance 
of a variance and a [conditional use permit] will also differ.”34 The 
hearing for a variance will focus on the applicant proving there is 
“‘undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the 
variance is not in conflict with the public interest.’”35 On the other 
hand, the hearing for a conditional use permit will generally “focus 
upon the conditions that should be attached to the permit.”36 
Therefore, despite a conditional use permit’s similarities to other 
zoning devices, such as variances, the conditional use permit stands 
alone in its important role. The conditional use permit allows a 
political subdivision to provide needed uses to an area that otherwise 
would not be allowed in that area. This increased flexibility is a 
powerful tool in the arsenal of a zoning authority. 
B. How the Conditional Use Permitting Process Works 
The process of obtaining a conditional use permit is relatively 
simple. An individual seeking a permit simply applies to the 
designated authority, and if the application is denied, appeals to the 
appropriate authority. However, what happens during the 
application process is not that simple. A recent case before the 
Supreme Court of South Dakota ably demonstrates the typical 
process required to obtain a conditional use permit.37 Mark Meier, a 
farmer, desired to build two hog confinement facilities on his 
property.38 This use was zoned as a conditional use in the zone 
where his property was located.39 Meier began his quest to construct 
the hog confinement facilities by filing an application with the local 
Board of Adjustments.40 After conducting a public hearing, where 
Meier and the general public were allowed to speak, the Board of 
 
 33. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6512(d)(8) (West 2014). 
 34. Burns Holdings, 272 P.3d at 417. 
 35. Id. (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6516). 
 36. Id. 
 37. In re Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 2000). 
 38. Id. at 524. 
 39. Id. at 525. 
 40. Id. at 524. 
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Adjustments took the matter under consideration and voted to deny 
the conditional use permit.41 However, the denial of the permit was 
not the end of the process.42 Here, as in most states, the conditional 
use permitting statute provided a means of appealing the board’s 
decision.43 
Following the denial, Meier appealed the decision to the local 
circuit court.44 At the circuit court, “Meier presented numerous 
witnesses and pieces of documentary evidence” to prove that he 
complied with the local zoning ordinance.45 The court affirmed the 
denial of Meier’s application, and Meier appealed again.46 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded because the trial court applied the wrong standard.47 
The ordinance governing Meier requires the following before a 
conditional use permit is granted: (1) a written application indicating 
the section of the zoning ordinance under which the conditional use 
is sought and the grounds for which it is requested; (2) notice of 
public hearing and the holding of a hearing; (3) the zoning board to 
make particular findings of fact that it has authority to grant the 
conditional use permit and that “the granting of the conditional use 
will not adversely affect the public interest;” (4) additional findings 
that the conditional use meets certain general conditions relating to 
traffic, parking, proper disposal of refuse, etc.; and (5) a finding that 
the proposed use meets the specific criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance relating to that particular conditional use.48 
This detailed and specific statutory scheme is how a conditional 
use permitting statute should look and function. The statutory 
scheme provides a clear process for the applicant to follow. 
Additionally, the statute provides clear standards the zoning board 
should apply. The statute lists specific negative effects, which make 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Compare id. at 524 with SLC CODE § 21A.33. 
 44. Meier, 613 N.W.2d at 524. In other jurisdictions, there are often lengthier appeals 
processes, which require an appeal to a zoning board or city council before the applicant may 
resort to judicial assistance. See, e.g., SLC CODE §§ 21A.54.156–21A.54.170. 
 45. Meier, 613 N.W.2d at 524. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 530. 
 48. See id. at 525–27 (quoting the Aurora County Zoning ordinance governing 
conditional use permits and “performance standards” for commercial animal feeding 
operations). 
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the use merely a conditional use and not a permitted use. This list 
provides the board with clear directions about what the board should 
look at when deciding whether to grant or deny the application for a 
conditional use permit. Even more importantly, it provides the board 
with a clear idea of the types of conditions the board can properly 
attach to the conditional use permit if it is granted.49 
C. “Reasonable Conditions” 
So far, our discussion has focused on the purpose of conditional 
use permits and the process for obtaining one. Some of the key 
factors in any analysis of a conditional use permit are the conditions 
attached to an application for a permit that is granted. Conditions 
are attached to a conditional use permit to ameliorate the negative 
effects of that use. Many states regulate the imposition of conditions 
by requiring that any conditions attached to a conditional use permit 
be “reasonable.” For example, the Utah Code section authorizing 
the use of conditional use permits states “[a] conditional use shall be 
approved if reasonable conditions are proposed.”50 Most states and 
cities have similar provisions.51 While most localities require that 
conditions be “reasonable,” the meaning of that term is typically 
undefined by the governing statutes and codes. 
However, despite a dearth of definitions for the term 
“reasonable,” the proper definition is readily apparent. A condition is 
reasonable if it is directly related to the proposed use and is aimed at 
mitigating the potential detrimental effects of the use. For example, 
New York courts have held zoning boards can “impose ‘reasonable 
conditions and restrictions as are directly related to and incidental to 
the proposed use of the property,’ and aimed at minimizing the 
adverse impact to an area that might result” from the proposed use.52 
The court in St. Onge v. Donovan listed several reasonable 
 
 49. In the Meier case, however, we did not see this in action because his application 
was denied. 
 50. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-507(2)(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
 51. See, e.g., RIVERSIDE, CAL., CODE § 19.760.010(B) (2007); KERSEY, COLO., LAND 
USE CODE § 3.9(D)(3) (2014); LONG LAKE, MINN., CODE § 28(4)(C) (2008); N.Y., TOWN 
LAW § 274-b(4) (1998); LA GRANDE, OR., LAND DEV. CODE & ORDINANCE 3210 § 
8.5.004(E) (2013); CLALLAM COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 33.27.040(2) (2014). This is just a 
small sampling of the numerous state and city codes allowing “reasonable” conditions to be 
attached to conditional use permits that are approved by the local zoning board. 
 52. St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting Pearson v. 
Shoemaker, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Gen. Term 1960). 
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conditions.53 The reasonable conditions the court listed would 
“relate ‘to fences, safety devices, landscaping, screening and access 
roads . . . outdoor lighting and noises, [] enclosure of buildings [] 
relating to emission of odors, dust, smoke, refuse matter, vibration 
noise, and other factors incidental to comfort, peace, enjoyment, 
health or safety of the surrounding area.’”54 The court reasoned 
conditions such as those listed “are proper because they relate 
directly to the use of the land” and because they “are corrective 
measures designed to protect neighboring properties against the 
possible adverse effects of that use.”55 In addition, the court stated 
conditions may be improper if the conditions do not seek to 
ameliorate the negative effects of the land use.56 
Courts in other jurisdictions have given similar meaning to the 
phrase “reasonable conditions.” For instance, the Court of Appeals 
in Washington held “reasonable conditions” are a necessary part of 
the conditional use permit scheme.57 The court stated the zoning 
board had “inherent authority to impose conditions” on a 
conditional use permit when the conditions “ensur[e] the use meets 
the county’s zoning goals as set forth in [the general plan].”58 The 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania similarly held “a reasonable 
condition must (1) relate to a standard in the applicable zoning 
ordinance [or state code] and (2) be supported by evidence in the 
record before the zoning [] board.”59 In addition, the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina stated “a condition imposed on a 
conditional use permit is improperly imposed when it is not related 
to the use of the land.”60 
A recent case from Missouri also emphasizes that a “reasonable 
condition” is a condition related to the use of the property.61 In that 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Pearson, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 781). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Schlotfeldt v. Benton Cnty., 292 P.3d 807, 810–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) 
(citation omitted) (stating that “reasonable conditions may be necessary” to achieve zoning 
goals). 
 58. Id. at 811. 
 59. Whitehall Fiduciary, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 49 A.3d 945, 948 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2012). 
 60. Nw. Prop. Grp. v. Town of Carrboro, 687 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting Overton v. Camden City, 574 S.E.2d 150, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 61. Curry Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 399 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013). 
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case, a property owner sought a conditional use permit to open a 
pawn shop.62 The Board of Zoning Adjustment conditioned approval 
of the permit on the removal of two nonconforming outdoor 
advertising signs.63 The court, however, noted that the signs were a 
valid nonconforming use, and held this condition was unreasonable.64 
The court reached this conclusion because this condition was 
unrelated to the conditional use permit.65 
When viewed together, these cases make it clear that a condition 
is only reasonable when it relates to the proposed use of the property 
and the condition serves to further a legitimate zoning interest. 
Thus, the imposition of conditions enhances a local zoning board’s 
ability to provide flexibility within its jurisdiction. The local board 
can approve a use that will improve the character of the community 
while at the same time limiting the negative effects of that use. 
II. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
SCHEME 
Conditional use permits, by their nature, cause problems. They 
were created to provide flexibility. This flexibility, while it can be 
beneficial, also generates uncertainty and gives great power to the 
officials who make the decision to grant or deny a conditional use 
permit. This is the problem inherent in conditional use permits. While 
providing great flexibility to local land use boards is laudable, and 
necessary to provide for effective planning, the flexibility is also the 
cause of numerous problems. 
This Part will address some of the most common problems with 
conditional use permits. Often, the problem originates in the 
standards outlined in the governing statutes, but sometimes the 
problems are the result of the way the conditions apply to a permit. 
First, this Part will address the problems created by vague standards 
in the statutes authorizing the issuance of conditional use permits. 
Second, it will discuss how conditional use permits can run afoul of 
the nondelegation doctrine. Third, it will examine what happens 
when a condition imposed on a permit is an exaction. Fourth, this 
Part will scrutinize situations where conditions violate a property 
 
 62. Id. at 107. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 109–10. 
 65. Id. 
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owner’s vested rights, or the owner’s rights under a nonconforming 
use statute. Finally, this Part will examine various other 
constitutional issues common to conditional use permits. 
A. Vague Standards 
One of the more common problems with conditional use 
permitting statutes is vagueness. The Fourteenth Amendment 
commands that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”66 One of the ways a law may 
be unconstitutionally vague is if the law “authorizes or even 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”67 Thus, 
statutes “must provide explicit standards for those who apply them” 
to avoid “resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”68 
While a vague standard serves a purpose in the conditional use 
permit context, the standard cannot be so vague that it does not 
provide certainty to landowners. As noted above, one of the primary 
purposes of the conditional use permit is to provide flexibility to land 
use boards. Indeed, this flexibility is a great benefit to political 
subdivisions, in that it allows for controlled growth and for greater 
control of potentially problematic uses. This type of flexibility is 
good. However, when the statutes governing conditional use permits 
become so vague that they leave almost unbridled decision-making 
powers with land use boards, then the statutes become problematic. 
Several problems result from vague standards in conditional use 
permitting statutes. First, as noted by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, vague standards “‘open[] up both individual zoning 
decisions and the zoning ordinance provision itself to constitutional 
challenges as being arbitrary and capricious.’”69 The court also noted 
that, even if such a challenge does not succeed, “‘the uncertainty to 
landowners and citizens alike created by discretionary and/or 
standardless zoning review should be avoided.’”70 For example, in 
 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 67. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 
41, 56–57 (1999)). 
 68. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
 69. Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d 780, 798 (Wis. 2008) (quoting John B. 
Bredin, Common Problems with Zoning Ordinances, AM. PLANNING ASS’N ZONING NEWS, 
Nov. 2002, at 2). 
 70. Id. (quoting Bredin, supra note 69, at 2). 
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Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, the court was concerned with standards that 
were “simply not specific enough that one can reasonably say” what it 
takes to comply with the governing statutes.71 The court in this case 
took umbrage with standards for obtaining a conditional use permit 
that were subject to “significant interpretation.”72 These standards 
contained items such as recognizing the “needs of agriculture” and 
preserving natural growth.73 Contrast these standards with those 
mentioned above in the case of farmer Meier who was seeking a 
permit to build a facility for the housing of hogs.74 The standards in 
that case were much more specific and tailored to Meier’s particular 
use.75 Thus, when the standards for issuing a conditional use permit 
are too vague, or cannot be tied to a legitimate legislative purpose, the 
ordinance is likely to be struck down.76 
Second, such vague standards may become an unconstitutional 
prior restraint. The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin explained: 
A zoning ordinance is an unconstitutional prior restraint if it: 
(1) vests the governmental decision maker with unbridled 
discretion to determine whether it will issue the permit or license; 
or (2) fails to place limits on the time within which the 
governmental decision maker must make the permit or licensing 
determination.77 
In this case, a statute requiring conditional use permits for the 
operation of an adult entertainment business was found to be too 
vague because it left too much discretion in the hands of the 
governmental decision maker and had no specific time limits, and 
was therefore an unconstitutional prior restraint.78 The court came to 
this conclusion because the governing ordinance did not offer the 
zoning board “guidance respecting the proper considerations in 
 
 71. Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d at 800. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. In re Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523, 524 (S.D. 2000). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 530. 
 77. Green Valley Inv. LLC v. Cnty. of Winnebago, 790 F. Supp. 2d 947, 959 (E.D. 
Wis. 2011). 
 78. Id. at 959–60 (“[T]his is ‘[a] scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the 
decisionmaker [and] creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.’”) (quoting 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990)). 
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determining whether proposed conditional uses” were appropriate.79 
In addition, the statute allowed the zoning board to consider “‘any 
[additional factors] they deem appropriate.’”80 Accordingly, the court 
held this “unbridled discretion” in the hands of the zoning board 
“‘creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech,’” 
and thus constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.81 
Thus, even though conditional use permits are intended to 
provide flexibility, and are designed to leave decision making in the 
hands of local officials, the governing statutes must contain clear 
standards. When the statutes are vague, as is often the case, the 
statutes are susceptible to challenges for vagueness and as prior 
restraints. As the court noted in Bizzell, the possibility that a statute 
might be a prior restraint can adversely affects landowners and can 
have a negative effect on the growth of an area. 
B. Nondelegation Problems with Conditional Use Permits 
In addition to vague standards causing problems with due process 
rights and with unconstitutional prior restraints, standards that are 
too vague may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. This 
“doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that 
underlies our tripartite system of Government.”82 The Constitution 
states “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.”83 Thus, to uphold the “‘integrity . . . 
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution,’” the 
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to mean Congress 
generally cannot delegate its legislative authority to another branch of 
government.84 This doctrine also limits the extent to which 
legislatures can delegate authority to agencies.85 
However, legislative bodies “simply cannot do [their] job absent 
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”86 
Therefore, even though a legislature “generally cannot” delegate its 
 
 79. Id. at 959. 
 80. Id. (citation omitted). 
 81. Id. at 960 (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227). 
 82. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 84. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
 85. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201. 
 86. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
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authority, a legislature can legally delegate some authority if the 
legislature “‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle 
to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to 
conform.’”87 While the precise meaning of “intelligible principle” 
has evaded judicial definition,88 the Court has provided some 
guidance on this point. The Court, in American Power & Light Co. 
v. SEC, stated it is “constitutionally sufficient” if the intelligible 
principle “clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency 
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated 
authority.”89 Nevertheless, these standards are vague and have led 
some to wonder if the nondelegation doctrine is enforceable in any 
measure.90 
In the context of zoning, it is “clear” that the power to zone 
“involves legislative functions which cannot be [] delegated under 
constitutional principles of separation of governmental powers.”91 It 
is equally clear that a “zoning plan may properly permit 
administrators [such as a zoning board] to ‘find facts,’” and to 
determine, when appropriate standards are given by the legislature, 
whether variances or exceptions are permissible.92 Furthermore, the 
power to grant conditional use permits is also a delegation of 
power.93 However, many provisions relating to conditional use 
permits have been struck down because the zoning authority was left 
“absolutely unguided” in determining whether to issue such a 
 
 87. Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928)). 
 88. Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship 
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 933–34 (2006) 
(“Yet while acknowledging the intelligible principle test as the measure of whether a statute 
violates the nondelegation doctrine, the Court has declined to give any strict definition of an 
intelligible principle.”) (footnote omitted). 
 89. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
 90. See Garry, supra note 88 at 938. See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the intelligible principle 
doctrine does not serve its purpose in limiting legislative cessions of power); Mistretta, 488 U.S. 
at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What legislated standard, one must wonder, can possibly be too 
vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public 
interest’ standard?”). 
 91. Shipley, supra note 9, at 1086 (footnote omitted). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Nassau Children’s House, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 430 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 
(App. Div. 1980) (“A special exception permit can be issued only upon fulfillment of the 
conditions mandated in the delegation of power contained in the zoning ordinance.”). 
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permit.94 Nevertheless, when the delegation of authority to issue 
conditional use permits “contain[s] sufficient restrictive standards for 
the guidance of the administrative officials,” the delegation of power 
has usually been upheld as constitutional.95 
For example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated 
“[i]t is well settled” that cities possess only the powers “expressly 
granted to them by the [legislature].”96 In In re Maibach, LLC, the 
court grappled with whether the Board of Commissioner’s 
“Condition 66,” (out of ninety-eight conditions attached to 
Maibach’s conditional use permit) was proper.97 Guiding the court’s 
decision were the “express standards” of the zoning ordinance 
related to the specific conditional use Maibach sought.98 In the end, 
the condition was struck down as an impermissible fee; however, the 
process of this case is illustrative of how a properly drafted 
conditional use statute avoids the problem of nondelegation.99 
Because the legislature provided “express” criteria for the Board of 
Commissioners to apply, the statute did not impermissibly delegate 
the legislature’s powers.100 
In another case, a federal district court looked briefly at this 
issue. In Schulz v. Milne, the facts gave rise to a “cognizable claim” 
of an unconstitutional de facto delegation.101 The court in this case 
came to its conclusion after examining two Supreme Court cases 
where the Court found an unconstitutional delegation of power.102 
The delegations of power at issue in those cases detailed “‘no 
standard by which the power thus given [was] to be exercised,’”103 
and made the parties “‘free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or 
arbitrarily and [to] subject [others] to their will or caprice.’”104 Such 
 
 94. Shipley, supra note 9, at 1087. 
 95. Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted). 
 96. In re Maibach, LLC, 26 A.3d 1213, 1216 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (citing 
Hydropress Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. Of Upper Mount Bethel, 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003)). 
 97. Id. at 1214. In this case, Maibach was seeking a conditional use permit to operate an 
ethanol production plant. The Board of Commissioners approved the permit, subject to 
ninety-eight conditions. Id. at 1214. 
 98. Id. at 1216. 
 99. See id. at 1217. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 102. Id. at 711. 
 103. Id. (quoting Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912)). 
 104. Id. (quoting Wash. ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 
(1928)). 
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a standardless grant of zoning power the Court said is “‘repugnant’” 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of due process.105 In this 
case, the delegation challenge was sustained because the power to 
grant the permit rested in the board personally, without any clear 
standards from the legislature for the board to apply.106 
Accordingly, when a conditional use permitting statute does not 
provide clear standards for a zoning board to apply, the statute may 
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. 
When no “intelligible standard” is present, as in the Schulz case, the 
process may violate the due process clause as well as the 
constitutional command against the improper delegation of 
legislative powers. 
C. When Conditions Become Exactions 
Even when standards governing conditional use permits are not 
vague, they can cause problems. One particularly frightening 
problem is when the conditions attached to a conditional use permit 
are monetary or real property exactions. An exaction is a condition 
for development imposed on a piece of property requiring the 
developer to pay money or give property to mitigate anticipated 
negative effects of the development. However, as the Court noted in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, sometimes an exaction can be a taking.107 The same problem 
can occur when a condition imposed on a conditional use permit is 
an exaction. 
Several cases from California underscore the dangers of imposing 
exactions as “reasonable conditions” on a conditional use permit. In 
Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, the California Court of 
Appeals noted conditions attached to the approval of a permit “must 
‘substantially advance legitimate state interests.’”108 It further noted 
when a condition attached to such a permit “exact[s] money or real 
property from landowners,” it presents “an inherent and heightened 
risk that local government[s] will manipulate the police power to 
impose” unreasonable conditions unrelated to legitimate state 
 
 105. Id. (quoting Seattle Title Trust, 278 U.S. at 122). 
 106. Id. at 712. 
 107. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987). 
 108. Lambert v. City & Cnty of S.F., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 571 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
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interests.109 Thus, the government entity imposing the exaction on a 
permit must demonstrate an essential nexus between the exaction 
and a legitimate state interest.110 
In a subsequent case involving an exaction, the California 
Supreme Court noted exactions imposed on an ad hoc basis are 
much more troublesome than exactions that are legislatively 
mandated, such as an exaction included in a statute.111 When an 
exaction is imposed as a condition on a conditional use permit, it is 
often an ad hoc decision, not a result of a statutory command. Thus, 
exactions should be subject to heightened scrutiny. The California 
Supreme Court stated “[a]d hoc individual monetary exactions 
deserve special judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer 
citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are more likely to 
escape such political controls.”112 
In In re Maibach, LLC, mentioned above, “Condition 66” 
required Maibach to “pay one-half cent . . . for each gallon of ethanol 
produced” at the proposed ethanol plant.113 The Board of 
Commissioners required this fee “to provide emergency response 
services and to address other issues impacting the general public 
infrastructures of the Township.”114 This fee would fall within the 
definition of an exaction. Additionally, on its face, this may seem to 
“impose [a] reasonable condition[] on the grant of a conditional use 
[permit].”115 However, a reasonable condition relates to the “specific 
zoning ordinance at issue.”116 This condition was not reasonable.117 
The court reached this conclusion on state law grounds.118 The 
local ordinances made it illegal for a municipality “to require as a 
condition for approval of a land development . . . payment of any offsite 
 
 109. Id. (quoting Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 110. Id. 
 111. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) 
(requiring a hotel to pay $567,000 as a condition of approval of their application). 
 112. Id. 
 113. In re Maibach, LLC, 26 A.3d 1213, 1215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (citation 
omitted). 
 114. Id. (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. at 1216 (citation omitted). 
 116. Id. (citation omitted). 
 117. Id. at 1220. 
 118. Id. at 1216. 
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improvements” unless specifically authorized in the statute.119 Even 
though there was a clear legislative command that exactions such as 
this were not to be imposed on conditional use permits, the Board of 
Commissioners attached an exaction as a condition of granting the 
permit.120 What is more troubling, the board imposed this condition, 
and phrased it the way it did, because it knew two other businesses 
had already accepted an illegal exaction such as this one.121 This case 
provides a prime example of the situations described by the 
California Supreme Court, where exactions on conditional use 
permits need special judicial scrutiny to avoid the problem illustrated 
by this case. 
A case from New Jersey further illustrates the conditional 
exactions problem.122 Despite clear law stating the imposition of a 
financial condition “must be authorized by statute and implemented 
by municipal ordinance,” a municipality attached a condition that a 
developer must pay the city $4,000 per unit built.123 This law was in 
place because, in the absence of such standards, “the possibilities for 
abuse in [] negotiations between an applicant and a regulatory body, 
no matter how worthy the cause, are unlimited.”124 The approval of 
permits without clear standards would result in permits granted or 
denied “depending upon the board members’ arbitrary sense of how 
much an applicant should pay.”125 
Therefore, when exactions are imposed as a condition on a 
conditional use permit, these conditions are deserving of special 
judicial scrutiny. Such conditions may constitute unreasonable 
conditions, but may escape political control for at least two reasons. 
First, and most importantly, accepting the condition will often result 
in the permit being granted. This places great power in the hands of 
the government entity in charge of granting the permit. In essence, 
the government entity can hold the property owner hostage. Second, 
if the property owner is not a sophisticated developer or a wealthy 
 
 119. Id. at 1217 (citation omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1214. 
 121. Id. at 1218. 
 122. Pond Run Watershed Ass’n v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 937 
A.2d 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 123. Id. at 349 (quoting Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater Borough, 541 A.2d 
1105, 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)). 
 124. Id. (quoting Nunziato, 541 A.2d at 1110). 
 125. Id. (quoting Nunziato, 541 A.2d at 1110). 
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landowner, the property owner may not have the funds or the 
knowledge to challenge the exactions. Thus, such exactions will evade 
systematic assessment and escape political controls. 
D. Problems with Existing Non-conforming Uses and Vested Rights 
Often, planning commissions attach expiration dates as a 
condition on a conditional use permit. While this may seem like a 
good idea by providing an opportunity to review the use and ensure 
it is not adversely affecting the community, it is not. Conditional use 
permits typically run with the land.126 Not only may this condition 
not be “reasonable” (i.e., not relating to an anticipated negative 
effect of a proposed conditional use), but this particular condition 
may also run afoul of nonconforming use statutes and vested rights 
statutes. For example, under Utah law, property owners have a 
vested right once they have submitted a land use application 
complying with applicable ordinances and they have paid the 
associated fees, absent any compelling, countervailing public 
interest.127 Furthermore, under Utah law, even if the zoning 
ordinance were to change after the conditional use permit was 
granted, property owners have the right to continue using the 
property for the previous permitted use.128 
A case from California shows some of the problems inherent in 
attaching an expiration date to a conditional use permit. In 
California, as in Utah and many other states, receiving and relying on 
a conditional use permit would grant the permit holder the right to 
continue use of the property even if the zoning laws change 
subsequent to the permit being granted.129 In Goat Hill Tavern v. 
City of Costa Mesa, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
decision that the Goat Hill Tavern had vested rights to continue 
operations and that its conditional use permit should be renewed.130 
Goat Hill Tavern had been in continuous operation since 1955, a 
period of more than thirty years.131 In 1988, the owner expanded the 
tavern into adjoining commercial space to add a game room.132 After 
 
 126. Cohn v. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 2d 180 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955). 
 127. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-509 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 128. Id. at § 10-9a-511. 
 129. Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 386 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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the fact, the owner sought a conditional use permit, which he 
received with the condition that the permit would expire after six 
months.133 A year later, after receiving noise complaints, the city 
discovered the permit had expired and required the tavern to apply 
for a new permit, which was granted with a three-month expiration 
period.134 After the three-month period, the tavern applied for a new 
conditional use permit and received it with a new condition limiting 
the tavern’s hours of operation.135 Because of the new condition, the 
tavern filed suit and the district court stayed the enforcement of the 
new condition.136 When this permit expired, the tavern was denied a 
renewal due to public complaints about noise and trash.137 However, 
these complaints could not be linked to the tavern because there 
were several other bars in the vicinity and a nearby parking lot that 
served as a gathering point for homeless people in the area.138 When 
the conditional use permit expired, the city argued the tavern “lost 
all right to continue in business.”139 The court stated a renewal 
request can be properly denied only “if the permittee fails to comply 
with reasonable terms or conditions expressed in the permit” and if 
the business would constitute a nuisance.140 
A recent case in the Utah Court of Appeals shows an instance 
where a challenge similar to the one raised in Goat Hill could have 
been made. In Stevens v. LaVerkin City, Stevens had owned and 
operated an auto repair shop.141 Stevens received a valid conditional 
use permit in 2000.142 Later, he acquired a second lot and received a 
six-month conditional use permit for that lot.143 After six months, he 
obtained a new conditional use permit for the second lot with 
additional conditions attached.144 In 2004, the city council decided 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 387. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 391 (footnote omitted). 
 140. Id. (quoting O’Hagen v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1971)). 
 141. 183 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (showing how the “auto repair shop” 
had more in common with a junkyard than a mechanic’s shop). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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not to revoke Stevens’ original permit, but instead to change it to a 
temporary six-month permit with additional conditions imposed.145 
Later, in 2005, the city refused to renew both permits.146 Stevens 
later filed a “complaint against the City alleging a single cause of 
action: inverse condemnation.”147 Since Stevens never appealed any 
of the decisions regarding the conditional use permit and his 
business license expired, the court did not grant him relief.148 
Some additional facts from Stevens highlight the sorts of abuses 
possible when conditional use permits expire. Stevens was operating 
a business pursuant to a valid conditional use permit.149 The facts of 
the case state “at some point” the city began considering expanding 
the road that Stevens’ first permit was on.150 Because of the city’s 
consideration of widening the road, the city entered into 
negotiations with Stevens to purchase his property.151 The 
negotiations broke down in December 2005.152 While the 
negotiations were taking place, the city refused to renew the 
conditional use permits for both of Stevens’ lots.153 Even more 
startling, in January 2006, just a month after negotiations broke 
down, the city decided not to renew Stevens’ business license.154 
While these facts do not conclusively show the city abused its powers 
in not renewing Stevens’ permits and business license, the facts 
demonstrate the potential abuses requiring renewal of conditional 
use permits may lead to. A city can use the threat of not renewing a 
permit to force a landowner to discontinue a valid use. Furthermore, 
a city can attach additional conditions to the permit that are not in 
accordance with the zoning ordinances, which may violate the 
permittee’s vested rights. 
While the court did not review the city’s decisions to modify 
Stevens’ conditional use permits because he did not properly appeal 
those decisions, the court seemed like it wanted to address this issue. 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1063. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1068. 
 149. Id. at 1062. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1062–63. 
 154. Id. at 1063. 
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The court pointed out Stevens brought only “a single cause of 
action.”155 This seems to imply there are other issues that he could have 
brought. Because Stevens did not properly appeal the decisions about 
the permits, the court could not review those decisions. If Stevens had 
properly appealed the decisions regarding his conditional use permits, 
the court would have had an opportunity to address this issue. 
Thus, as demonstrated by these two cases, it is unlikely that an 
expiration date attached as a condition to a conditional use permit is 
a “reasonable” condition. As shown in Goat Hill, attaching an 
expiration date to a conditional use permit can create a host of legal 
issues. First, the expiration of the permit may violate the permit 
holder’s vested rights. Once the property owner has received a 
permit, she has the statutory right in most states to continue that use 
even if the zoning ordinances change in the future. If there is an 
expiration date attached to the conditional use permit, and the 
zoning ordinance changes, the government entity would have 
grounds to not renew the permit even though the permit holder has 
a right to continue the use as a nonconforming use. Additionally, 
when the permit is received, the city’s ability to revoke the permit is 
limited to situations where the permit holder does not comply with 
reasonable conditions or there is a compelling public necessity (e.g., 
the use constitutes a nuisance).156 
Second, the expiration gives the local board the opportunity to 
attach additional conditions to the permit that could unduly burden 
the property. In Goat Hill, for example, those additional conditions 
were eventually struck down by the court.157 
Third, the renewal process gives the city greater bargaining 
power with the permit holder. The city could possibly use its power 
to force the property holder to accept new conditions or make 
substantial changes to the property to get the conditional use permit 
renewed. These possible violations of the permit holder’s rights make 
imposing expiration dates on conditional use permits a legally 
hazardous decision. 
However, there may be circumstances where an expiration date is 
a reasonable condition. For example, if the applicant knows the 
permit will expire, and there is no guarantee the permit will be 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 157. Id. at 392. 
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renewed, this may get around the vested rights issue. If there is no 
expectation the use will be allowed following the expiration of the 
permit, it cannot be said that the permit holder has relied upon the 
permit to establish a right to continue that use. Additionally, it may 
be proper to attach an expiration date as part of an effort to inspect 
the property to ensure the conditions imposed on the permit are 
being met. If the conditions are not being met, such would likely be 
valid grounds to revoke the permit and would not violate the 
owner’s vested rights. 
In addition to expiration dates causing problems, the 
extinguishment of a conditional use permit on any other ground 
could likewise cause problems. Since conditional use permits run 
with the land, the extinguishment of a right to continue to use the 
property in the manner previously authorized will also likely result in 
legal challenges. For example, a subsequent change in zoning laws 
likely would not extinguish the right to use the property in the 
formerly permitted manner. 
A case from Minnesota illustrates the challenges of extinguishing 
a conditional use permit. In White v. City of Elk River, Lorraine 
White operated a campground in the city of Elk River.158 After the 
campground began operation, the zoning ordinances changed, 
turning campgrounds into a non-permitted use, then into a 
conditional use, and eventually removing campgrounds entirely from 
the zone.159 During the period when campgrounds were a 
conditional use, White applied for, and received, a conditional use 
permit.160 When the campground later violated the conditions of the 
permit, the city revoked the permit and stated White was no longer 
authorized to operate the campground.161 The issue in this case was 
whether the receipt of the conditional use permit revoked the 
campground’s nonconforming use status. The court held it did 
not.162 The court also held there are four ways in which a 
municipality can terminate an owner’s right to continue a 
nonconforming use: (1) through eminent domain, (2) by operation 
of law when the use has been discontinued for more than a year, (3) 
when the use has been destroyed to an extent greater than fifty 
 
 158. White v. City of Elk River, 840 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn. 2013). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 51. 
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percent, and (4) by judicial determination that the use is a 
nuisance.163 Thus, revoking a conditional use permit does not 
terminate a property owner’s right to continue a nonconforming use. 
Therefore, using the passage of time is another troublesome way 
municipalities apply conditions to conditional use permits. The 
attachment of expiration dates can lead to violations of the owner’s 
vested rights and nonconforming rights. Furthermore, unless there is 
notice beforehand, revoking a permit may also be an illegal action by 
a government entity. 
E. Other Constitutional Problems 
Besides problems with vagueness and prior restraints, conditions 
attached to conditional use permits can run afoul of other 
constitutional rights—especially those guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. Two cases demonstrate the potential First Amendment 
problems that can arise with conditional use permits. The first deals 
with the freedom of speech; the second, with freedom of religion. 
In Barbulean v. City of Newburgh, a vague statute created an 
unconstitutional time, place, and manner restriction.164 Barbulean 
operated an adult video store.165 After installing thirteen videotape–
viewing booths, he was required to obtain a conditional use permit.166 
When he failed to do so and was subsequently cited, he challenged the 
constitutionality of that ordinance.167 The New York court held the 
statute was facially unconstitutional because there were insufficient 
standards in the statute for the appeals board to determine whether or 
not to grant a conditional use permit.168 The court reasoned that 
when the articulated standards for granting a permit are vague, “the 
spectre of censorship may exist just as clearly as where there are no 
standards at all.”169 The standards in this case raised this spectre of 
censorship because the standards included twelve factors, one of which 
gave the board permission to consider anything it wished.170 The 
 
 163. Id. at 52. 
 164. Barbulean v. City of Newburgh, 640 N.Y.S.2d 935, 948–49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 165. Id. at 939. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 944. 
 169. Id. at 948 (citing Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 706 (M.D. Fla. 
1978)). 
 170. Id. 
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court concluded this statute was unconstitutionally vague, which, in 
this case, amounted to an unconstitutional abridgment of Barbulean’s 
First Amendment rights.171 
In the second case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found a 
conditional use permitting scheme violated provisions of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”).172 Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas, a 
Christian church in Yuma, Arizona, purchased a building on Main 
Street to hold church services in.173 However, the church was 
required to get a conditional use permit to hold services in that 
building.174 The zoning code required religious organizations to get 
a conditional use permit, but allowed other “membership 
organizations” to operate in that area without a permit.175 Because 
the ordinance singled out religious organizations and treated them 
differently from other, similar organizations, the ordinance violated 
RLUIPA.176 
While these are just two examples, the constitutional problems 
raised by improper conditional use permitting practices are 
numerous. As the Supreme Court noted, “[t]he power of censorship 
inherent in this type of ordinance reveals its vice.”177 The broad 
powers given to zoning authorities gives them great power to censor. 
When standards are vague, that problem is amplified. 
III. CONCLUSION 
While conditional use permits serve an important function, they 
also create a host of problems because of their inherent vagueness. 
Conditional use permits are intended to provide flexibility. However, 
the intended flexibility often results in overly vague statutes that 
create too much uncertainty and give land use boards too much 
discretion—discretion that can often violate the rights of the citizens 
the zoning ordinance is intended to help. The ordinances can cause 
problems with vagueness, nondelegation, exactions, vested rights, 
 
 171. Id. at 948–49. 
 172. Centro Familiar Cristiano Buena Nueva v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
 173. Id. at 1166. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1166–67. 
 176. Id. at 1175. 
 177. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). 
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and First Amendment rights. As the Supreme Court recently noted, 
“land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of 
coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits 
because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit 
that is worth far more than property it would like to take.”178 When 
a property owner applies for a conditional use permit, she should be 
able to know with some degree of certainty whether her application 
will be accepted and what conditions may attach. Sadly, that is often 
not the case. The result is wasted time, money, and sometimes even 
a violation of the landowner’s rights. 
While there are no easy solutions to this problem, that does not 
give us the right to ignore this issue. Conditional use permits serve 
an indispensable purpose in our communities. Without these permits 
we would be left without schools, grocery stores, or hospitals near 
our homes. Thus, we must work to make the statutes clearer and less 
open to interpretation, while at the same time leaving enough 
discretion in the local zoning commissions to allow the imposition of 
reasonable conditions to ameliorate the negative impacts of 
conditional uses. 
Because of the flexible nature of conditional use permits, the 
statutes are purposefully vague. Nevertheless, providing flexibility in 
zoning cannot override constitutional and other concerns. Finding 
the proper balance between these competing interests is a task of 
Gordian proportions. Thus, the problems outlined in this Comment 




 178. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013). 
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